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LEGISLATION N OTES
CONCLUSION
There is a paramount need for proper seat belt legislation. The existing
statutes, enacted by less than half of our fifty states, have not met the
urgency of the situation. Except for certain provisions of a few statutes,
the legislatures have not proceeded far enough.48
A comprehensive, effective seat belt statute does not presently exist.
Such an enactment would insure that all occupants of every motor vehicle
are afforded the protection of seat belts. In addition, this model legislation
would establish quality standards for the belts and provide penalties in
such manner that the statute would realize its protective purpose.
James Nolan
CRIMINAL LAW-REQUIRING CITIZENS TO
AID A PEACE OFFICER
The power of the sheriff to summon private citizens to his assistance
was first granted by English statutes dealing with the suppression of un-
lawful assemblies and the pursuit of felons.' From these statutes the au-
thority of the sheriff to summon the posse comitatus was ultimately devel-
oped. 2 At common law it was held that every person who refused to assist
an officer in the execution of his duty was guilty of a common law mis-
demeanor.3 This doctrine was applicable only in cases involving breach of
the peace, where there existed a reasonable necessity for requesting such
aid and where the person summoned was not prevented from assisting by
any physical incapacity or legal excuse.
While primarily legal in nature, some courts have recognized that the
obligation of private citizens to aid peace officers has strong moral over-
tones. In Krueger v. State,4 the decedent, who had voluntarily responded
to a call for assistance by a marshall's deputy, was killed in a gun battle
between the defendants and the posse. In rejecting the defendant's conten-
tion that the decedent lacked authority to assist the marshall bcause he had
not been formally summoned, the court expressed the opinion that any-
one who responded to the marshall's request was authorized to assist him
48 Some legislatures seem reluctant to proceed at all. Seat belt legislation was pro-
posed, but not enacted, in the legislatures of the following states in 1963 and 1964:
Alaska, Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota and Texas.
1 1 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW § 2'4 (4th Ed. 1931); 1 BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES § 343 (Chitty Ed. 1836).
2 HOCHHEIMER, CRIMINAL LAW § 115 (1911); IV BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 5 122
(Lewis Ed. 1902).
3Re: Quales, 158 U.S. 532 (1895); Comfort v. Commonwealth, 5 Wharton 437 (Pa.
1840); PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 877 (1957).
4 171 Wis. 566, 177 N.W. 917 (1926).
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and that a formal request was unnecessary. In addition the court held
that anyone who had knowledge of the call for assistance was duty bound
to respond. The court stated that while there existed no penalty in Wis-
consin at that time for refusing to assist the marshall, this obligation was
a "moral duty incident to citizenship."5
Following this line of reasoning, the Attorney General of Maryland
stated in a formal opinion that, because the peace officer is constantly
being called upon to keep the peace and protect the lives and property
of private citizens, he should be entitled to the assistance of his fellow
citizens, both as a matter of law and as a moral duty on the part of such
citizens. 6
By statute, forty-six states have specifically recognized the power of
the sheriff to request the assistance of a private citizen or to call a posse
comitatuS.7 Forty-two of these states have imposed sanctions on those
who refuse such requests." It is the purpose of this note to compare and
5 Id. at 583, 177 N.W. at 924.
6 Baltimore Daily Record, Aug. 7, 1964, p. 4, col. 2; -Opinions of Maryland Attor-
ney GeneraL (1964).
7ALA. CODE ANN. S 14-403, S 14-404, S 15-156 (Supp. 1963); ALASKA STAT. ANN.
511.30.200, S 12.25.090 (Supp. 1962); ARMX. REV. STAT. ANN. S 13-542, 5 13-1410 (Supp.
1963); ARK. STAT. ANN. S 42-202, 5 42-204, § 42-208, § 43-415 (Supp. 1963); CAL. PEN.
CODE § 150, § 839, (Supp. 1963); COLO. REV. STAT. S 40-7-49 (Supp. 1961); CoNN. STAT.
ANN. S 6-31, S 53-173 (Supp. 1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 5 2723 (Supp. 1962); FLA.
STAT. § 843.06, § 901.18 (Supp. 1963); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-206 (Supp. 1963); IDAHO CODE
ANN. 5 18-707, S 19-606 (Supp. 1961); ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 38 S 31-8, § 107-8 (Supp. 1963);
IND. ANN. STAT. S 9-10-12, 5 10-1006 (Supp. 1964); IOWA CODE ANN. § 742.2, 5 742.3,
S 742.5 (Supp. 1963); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. S 13-514 (Supp. 1961); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 70.060, S 432.530 (Supp. 1962); LA. REV. STAT. § 15.65, § 15.65-1, (Supp. 1962); ME.
REV. STAT. ch. 89 § 201, ch. 135 § 19 (Supp. 1954); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 37:13,
S 268:24 (Supp. 1963); MICH. STAT. ANN. tit. 27 § 218, tit. 28 § 751 (Supp. 1963); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 629.403 (Supp. 1964); MISS. CODE ANN. 5 2468 (Supp. 1962); Mo. ANN.
STAT. S 542.170, S 542.200, § 542.210, § 544.230 (Supp. 1963); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 16-2702, 594-35-177, §94-5301 (Supp. 1963); NEB. REV. STAT. §23-1704, 528-728,
§ 28-805 (Supp. 1963); NEV. REV. STAT. § 199.420 (Supp. 1963); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 594:6 (Supp. 1963); N.M. STAT. ANN. 5 39-1-8, § 40A-22-2 (Supp. 1953); N.Y. JUDICI-
ARY CODE § 400, N.Y. PEN. CODE § 1848, 5 1849 (Supp. 1963); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-224,
§ 15-45 (Supp. 1963); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12-17-02, 5 12-17-04 (Supp. 1963); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2833, § 2917.32, § 4386 (Supp. 1963); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 § 516,
tit. 21 § 537, tit. 22 § 91, § 181 (Supp. 1963); ORE. REV. STAT. § 93-9-38 (Supp. 1947)
§ 162.530, § 206.050 (Supp. 1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 54313, § 4314 (Supp. 1963);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-29-25 (Supp. 1963); S.C. CODE 53-199 (Supp. 1963); S.D.
CODE tit. 34 § 1601 (Supp. 1960). TENN. CODE ANN.§ 8-822, 5 39-3105 (Supp. 1964);
TEXAS CIVIL STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 6876, § 6886 (Supp. 1963); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-28-57,
§ 77-5-1 (Supp. 1963); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 5 300, § 301 (Supp. 1963) VA. CODE ANN.
§ 15-514, § 18-301 (Supp. 1964); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.69.030, § 9.69.050 (Supp.
1963); W. Va. Code S 56-3-18, § 61-5-14 (Supp. 1964); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 59:24, § 946:40
(Supp. 1964); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-181, § 6-182 (Supp. 1963).
8 Those four states which do not impose sanctions for refusing assistance are Ala-
bama, Deleware, Mississippi and South Dakota. While Maryland is one of the states
which has not enacted any statutes on this point, the Attorney General of Maryland
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analyze this type of statute in regard to such factors as who may be
summoned, possible civil liability of those summoned and whether there
exist any defenses for refusing to aid an officer. The note will also ex-
amine the problems faced by the legislature in determining the nature of
the sanction to be imposed.
WHO MAY BE SUMMONED
The statutes all identify those persons who may be summoned to assist
an officer or to join a posse comitatus. In nine states, only males over
eighteen may be called.9 While the other states do not place an age limit
on those who may be summoned, they require, in essence, that anyone
called must assist. Obviously, when a person is called upon by an officer,
he may be required to exert various degrees of physical force. It is rea-
sonable to assume that older persons might well be unable to assist in
situations where physical force is required to subdue an offender or to
quell a riot. Louisiana, recognizing the existence of such situations, has
provided that only persons of ages over eighteen and under forty-five
may be summoned. 10 Those states which have utilized a lower age limit
have tacitly recognized the fact that persons below a given age are not
capable of reasonably assisting an officer. Because elderly persons are not
generally able to render such assistance as could a person of a more vig-
orous age, the legislatures of the various states would be wise to follow
Louisiana's lead and affix an upper age limitation to their statutes.
SANCTIONS
A wide variety of sanctions have been imposed by the legislatures of
the various states, ranging from small fines to imprisonment." The fines
of $200 and $500 which have been imposed by Wyoming'12 and Ver-
mont"1 seem to be about average.
Because of the peculiar nature of the obligation, the type of sanction
imposed should not be de-emphasized. By imposing an excessive penalty
the legislature is in effect attempting to compel an individual to perform
has expressed the opinion that the duty to aid a peace officer was part of the state's
common law; Baltimore Daily Record, Aug. 7, 1964, p. 4, col. 2.
9 Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, Nevada, Utah and Wy-
oming limit those who may be called upon to aid an officer or to join a posse comitatus
to males over eighteen.
10 LA. REv. STAT. S 15.65.1 (Supp. 1962).
11 For example, Kentucky imposes only a nominal fine of $15, while states such as
Arizona and California impose fines of up to $1,000. Virginia prescribes imprisonment
of six months and a fine, while Michigan and New York, among other states, make
refusal to assist a misdemeanor under state law.
12 Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-182 (Supp. 1963).
18 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 S 301 (Supp. 1963).
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a moral act which he may not wish to perform. Conversely, if the pen-
alty is too light, citizens might get the impression that the legislature
imposed only a nominal sanction because the duty was unimportant. If
the courts were also to interpret the duty as unimportant, then a situation
could result wherein these statutes would be ineffective no matter what
they provided. If the courts felt the duty to be unimportant, and local
prosecutors agreed, they might well elect not to prosecute for violations
of the statute.14 Therefore, since a statute is only as effective as the en-
forcement behind it, the legislatures should provide a sanction strict
enough to discourage non-compliance with its provisions.
POSSIBLE CIVIL LIABILITY
Most statutes fail to answer the question of whether a person aiding a
peace officer may incur civil liability to the arrestee. Illinois has provided
that if the person rendered aid which was reasonable under the circum-
stances, he would not incur civil liability.15 This statute would seem to
follow the reasoning adopted by the majority of the courts with similar
problems.' 6 Those courts have stated that if a person renders aid to a
known officer which is reasonable under the circumstances, he incurs no
liability to the arrestee, even though the officer may have exceeded his
authority or acted without justification in regard to the arrestee.
In Dietrichs v. Shaw,' 7 an attempt was made to distinguish between
situations where the officer was and was not known as such to the person
summoned. Upholding the conviction of parties who assisted an "officer"
acting without authority, the court held that persons aiding a "supposed
officer" (one who is not known as a peace officer to the person summoned)
are bound to know whether he is authorized to act. If he be not author-
ized, then those assisting him would also lack authority to act.18
14 Letter dated August 31, 1964, from Edward J. Egan, First Assistant State's Attorney
of Cook County, Illinois, addressed to DEPAUL LAw REVIEW and on file in De Paul
University Law Library. The letter states that while the State's Attorney's office keeps
no records of such prosecutions, no one in that office could remember any such prose-
cutions in the last 25 years.
15 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 S 107-8 (Supp. 1963).
16 Kagcl v. Brugger, 19 Wis. 2d 1, 19 N.W.2d 394 (1963); Peterson v. Robison, 43
Cal. 2d 690, 277 P.2d 19 (1954); Moyer v. Foster, 205 Okla. 415, 234 P.2d 415 (1951);
Moyer v. Mieir, 205 Okla. 405, 238 P.2d 338 (1951); State v. Parker, 355 Mo. 916, 199
S.W.2d 338 (1947); Mackie v. Ambassador Hotel & Investment Co., 123 Cal. App. 215,
11 P.2d 3 (1932); Presley v. Ft. Worth & D.C. Ry. Co., 145 S.W. 669 (Tex. Civ. App.
1912); Commonwealth v. Sadowsky, 80 Pa. Super 496 (1923); Robinson v. State, 193
Ga. 77, 18 S.E. 1018 (1893); Firestone v. Rice, 71 Mich. 377, 38 N.W. 885 (1888). This
view was also adopted by the RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 139 (2) §139(2) comment d (1939).
Contra, Martin v. Houck, 141 N.C. 317, 54 S.E. 291 (1906); Pew v. Beckner, 3 Ind. 475
(1852).
17 43 Ind. 174 (1873).
1s Cf. Hooker v. Smith, 19 Vt. 151 (1847); Oystead v. Shed, 12 Tying (Mass.) 505
(1815).
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An interesting problem exists with regard to civil liability and the sanc-
tions imposed for refusing to assist. It would seem a direct relationship
might develop between civil liability and the sanction imposed. Should
the sanction be too light, a person might tend more readily to accept a
small fine than to possibly incur civil liability, either for failing to assist
reasonably, or for acting without discovering the capacity or justification
of the person requesting assistance. An associated problem exists concern-
ing the steps a person must take to discover whether the person requesting
assistance is in fact a peace officer. An example of this would be a situation
where the officer is out of uniform, or where he may be so involved in
apprehending an offender, that he could not take the time to identify
himself. While there is no specific authority covering this point, un-
doubtedly, if the person acts reasonably under the circumstances in at-
tempting to learn the officer's capacity, he should not be found civilly
liable for any acts which he may perform.
These problems may be resolved by a clarification of the circumstances
under which civil liability may result, for example, if the person rendering
assistance acts in an unreasonable or wanton manner.19 Another deterrent
to inaction by citizens would be the provision of an effective sanction to
discourage non-compliance with the assistance statute.
DEFENSES: REASONABLE GROUNDS FOR REFUSAL TO AID
Reasonable grounds for refusing to come to the assistance of an officer
have been recognized in the statutes of only six states.20 In addition, the
statutes of eight states provide that only if one wilfully neglects or re-
fuses to render assistance should he be Funished.21 The balance of the
states which have enacted statutes make no mention of defenses. A pos-
sible reason for their failure to so do would seem to follow the reasoning
of Dougherty v. State,2 2 which held that the duty was of an absolute
nature.23 Nothwithstanding adherence tc the "absolute duty theory,"
Arkansas has recognized that physical incapacity of the party summoned
constitutes a valid defense.24 By statute, Georgia has specifically recog-
19State v. Parker, 355 Mo. 916, 199 S.W.2d 338 (1947); People v. Brooks, 131 Cal. 311,
63 Pac. 464 (1901).
20 Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, Oklahoma, VVisconsin and Wyoming recognize
a reasonable cause for refusing.
21 Iowa, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee
and Washington punish those who wilfully neglect or refuse to render assistance to
an officer.
22 106 Ala. 63, 17 So. 393 (1895).
23 Accord, State v. Ditmore, 177 N.C. 592, 99 S.E. 368 (1919), Mitchell v. State, 12 Ark.
50, 50 Am. Dec. 253 (1851). Cf. Kindred v. Stitt, 5:. I1. 401 (1869).
24 Greenwood v. Smothers, 103 Ark. 158, 146 S.V. 109 (1912).
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nized that physical incapacity is a defense to a person summoned to quell
mob violence.25 While the Dougherty case determined that danger to the
person summoned was not a valid defense, it would be reasonable for those
states which recognize defenses to include danger to the person sum-
moned, since they obviously did not intend the duty to be absolute.2 6
Another logical defense would be that the party summoned did not
know that the person requesting assistance was a peace officer. However,
with the exception of Illinois27 and Wisconsin,28 the statutes do not rec-
ognize it. Both Illinois and Wisconsin provide that only if the person
summoned by a known peace officer refuses assistance shall he be pun-
ished. Again the problem is raised as to the extent to which a party must
proceed to discover the authority of the officer.
In the light of the combined legal-moral nature of this duty, it follows
that the duty should not be held as absolute, but that if reasonable grounds
for refusal to assist exist, then one should not be punished under the
statute.
CONCLUSION
An ideal statute defining the duty to aid a peace officer should take
into account the age and sex of those who may be summoned, the nature
of the sanction to be imposed as well as the problem of possible civil lia-
bility. It should also determine whether a reasonable ground for refusing
is allowable as a defense and whether or not the person requesting assist-
ance must be known as a peace officer to the party summoned.
Such a statute might provide that all persons above the age of 18, but
below a certain age, e.g., 50, may be called by a person whom they reason-
ably believe to be a peace officer. Further, it should be stated in the statute
that one who assists will not incur liability if the aid rendered is
reasonable under the circumstances. The concept that persons should not
be punished for refusing assistance if a valid reason for doing so existed
should be incorporated in the enactment. And finally, the sanction im-
posed should be one strict enough to discourage non-compliance.
Floyd Krause
25 GA. CODE ANN. S 27-206 (Supp. 1963).
26Whether or not the duty is regarded as absolute, should the person responding
to the call for assistance be injured or killed as a result of such response, it has gener-
ally been held that he or his estate may recover for such injuries. Blackman v. City of
Cincinnati, 66 Ohio App. 495, 35 N.E.2d 164 (1941); Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp.,
250 N.Y. 14, 164 N.E. 726 (1928). Cf. Riker v. City of New York, 126 N.Y.S.2d 229
(1953). An example of a statute which allows such recovery may be found in ILL
REv. STAT. ch. 24, S 1-4-5 (Supp. 1963).
27 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 31-8 (Supp. 1963).
2s WIs. STAT. ANN. S 946.40 (Supp. 1961).
